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E 
he California Supreme Court 
recently decided two companion 
cases concerning assumption of 
, a common law tort defense. The 
isions do not signal a major theoret-
change in tort law in California, 
ply some new vocabulary applied 
existing concepts. However, the 
ication by the court of this new 
bulary to the facts of these cases 
mark a radical departure from the 
itional analysis of duty of care 
d by a negligent defendant to an 
red plaintiff. The different views 
by the litigants and judges of the 
in these cases suggest the impor-
of a continuing role for the jury 
tort adjudication. 
In Knight v. Jewett (1992) 3 Cal. 
296 and Ford v. Gouin (1992) 3 
. 4th 339, the court considered 
ther the classic tort defense of 
lied assumption of a reasonable 
had survived in California after the 
tion of comparative fault with Li 
ellow Cab (1975) 13 Cal. 3d 804. 
the supreme court eradicated 
ption of risk as a separate negli-
e defense "to the extent it is mere-
variant of the former doctrine of 
butory negligence." Li at 825. 
The aspect of implied assumption 
risk that had been abolished in Li 
ed to involve assumption by 
iff of an unreasonable risk, such 
cepting a ride home from an obvi-
drunk driver. See, ~., Gonzalez 
ia, 75 Cal.App. 3d 874, 142 Cal. 
03 (1977) (plaintiff accepting 
When alternatives such as calling a 
By Stephanie M. Wildman 
cab or asking wife to come pick him 
up, were readily available). Such con-
duct by a plaintiff, encountering a risk 
that is unreasonable in relation to his or 
her own safety, is contributorily negli-
gent. After Li, the question remained 
whether any part of the doctrine of 
implied assumption of risk endured. 
The doctrine is commonly miscon-
strued. A pedestrian who dashes across 
the middle of a busy street, trying to 
beat the oncoming cars, is not assum-
ing the risk of the drivers' negligence. 
(A much used torts hornbook, W.P. 
Keeton, D. Dobbs,R. Keeton, & D. 
Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Torts 
(5th ed. 1984) uses a similar example 
at 484-85.) In fact the pedestrian is 
assuming that the drivers will be extra 
careful and alert, slowing down when 
they see someone crossing illegally. 
The pedestrian's conduct can be char-
acterized as taking a risk, possibly a 
negligent one, but not as assumption of 
risk. 
Assumption of risk is traditionally 
tested on a subjective basis. Gonzalez, 
supra, 75 Cal. App. 3d at 878. Assump-
tion of risk must be voluntary. Prescott 
v. Ralph's Grocery Co. (1954) 42Cal. 
2d 158, 162, Restatement (Second) of 
Torts 496E ( 1965). Defendant must 
show that plaintiff knew of the risk and 
willingly took it. Assumption of risk is 
the "voluntary acceptance of a risk 
[where] such acceptance ... has been 
made with knowledge and appreciation 
of the risk." Prescott, supra, 42 Cal. 2d 
at 161-62. 
Under assumption of risk, plaintiff 
is implicitly agreeing to a defendant's 
use of less than reasonable care toward 
him or her. For plaintiff to assume a 
risk, plaintiff must be aware both of 
that specific risk, not just of general 
danger, and of the degree or magnitude 
of that risk. Thus, a plaintiff theoreti-
cally might agree, voluntarily and 
knowingly, to assume an unreasonable 
or a reasonable risk. As noted, the 
defense of assumption of an unreason-
able risk was merged into comparative 
fault. In Knight and Ford, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court had promised to 
resolve the question whether the 
defense of implied assumption of a rea-
sonable risk remained a distinct part of 
California tort law. 
In Knight the court issued several 
opinions, with no clear majority voice. 
The Knight plurality decision, authored 
by Justice George and joined by Jus-
tices Lucas and Arabian, acknowl-
edged that assumption of risk has been 
used in very dissimilar cases involving 
"analytically different legal concepts." 
Knight supra, 3 Cal.4th at 303. Those 
different legal concepts included using 
assumption of risk to describe either "a 
reduction of defendants duty of care" 
(Id. at 308) toward a a plaintiff or 
plaintiff's contributory negligence. Id. 
at 307. As to the distinction between 
reasonable and unreasonable assump-
tion of risk, the court said that the dis-
tinction was "more misleading than 
helpful." Id. at 309. 
Thus the plurality drew a distinc-
tion between two historical uses of the 
assumption of risk doctrine. The plu-
rality differentiated "those instances in 
which the assumption of risk doctrine 
embodies a legal conclusion that there 
is 'no duty' on the part of the defen-
dant to protect the plaintiff from a par-
ticular risk ... and (2) those instances 
in which the defendant does owe a duty 
of care to the plaintiff but the plaintiff 
knowingly encounters a risk of injury 
caused by the defendant's breach of 
that duty." Id. at 308. 
According to the court, the first 
kind of assumption of risk, termed pri-
mary assumption of risk, is not merged 
into comparative negligence. Thus a 
plaintiff's recovery would be barred in 
those cases. In the second sort of case, 
involving secondary assumption of 
risk, a plaintiff's conduct is analyzed 
under the comparative fault frame-
work, which might allow some tort 
recovery. 
Now every first year law student 
studying hornbook tort law will tell 
you that if the defendant owes no duty 
toward the plaintiff to use reasonable 
care then there is no prima facie case 
of negligence and no tort liability. 
Lawyers only concern themselves with 
the question of defenses to negligence 
once the prima facie case of tort liabili-
ty has been established. So the court's 
retention of primary assumption of risk 
in California tort vocabulary means 
that there is now another way for 
defense counsel to argue that no duty is 
owed to the plaintiff: defense counsel 
will say it is a case of primary assump-
tion of risk. 
It is unfortunate that the court chose 
to retain this assumption of risk lan-
guage, instead of relegating it to the 
realm of tort defense, and to inject it 
into the question of duty, the first issue 
in analyzing the negligence prima facie 
case. The court gave no elaboration on 
how a judge should decide if a duty is 
owed, using primary assumption of 
risk. Presumably, using the language of 
primary assumption of risk should not 
warrant a different inquiry than is usu-
ally made by a judge on the duty ques-
tion. 
Justice Mosk, concurring and dis-
senting in Knight, provided the fourth 
vote for affirming summary judgment 
for the defendant. Evidently he thought. 
that the duty inquiry made by the plu~ 
rality, whether called the duty element 
of the prima facie case or primary 
assumption of risk, led to the same 
liability result. He urged the court 
abolish the so-called defense and 
reach the no duty conclusion using tra~ 
ditional tort analysis. By abolishing 
doctrine of assumption of risk, 
court could have avoided the c011rus1mf.; 
that will be generated by calling 
doctrine a defense, but applying it 
part of the plaintiff's prima facie 
In terms of tort theory, plaintiff 
still show defendant owes her or him 
duty to use reasonable care. No 
may be viewed as a failure to prove 
negligence prima facie case or may 
called primary assumption of risk. If 
duty is owed by defendant to 1-''""'UJ'" 
then the negligence prima facie """·" .~~''" 
must be analyzed, followed by 
es, including comparative fault, 
will include secondary assumption 
risk. 
Nothing has changed in theory, 
except that a new name for the judicial 
ruling "no duty of reasonable care 
owed" has been added to California 
law: "primary assumption of risk." Are 
these cases, then, much ado about 
nothing? Unfortunately they are not1 
because it is in the application of 
tort theory to the facts of these 
that we see the radical change that has 
been slipped into California law 
these decisions. The situated nature of 
the judicial decision about duty of 
is veiled under a new layer of vocabu· 
lary. 
Generally when one engages in 
activity, the actor has the duty to do 
reasonably, using reasonable care 
toward those with whom the actor 
come into contact. Special duty 
historically have arisen in cases of 
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another, landowners and occupiers, 
economic harm, and emotional harm. 
These special duty cases have raised 
question whether the defendant 
the plaintiff a duty to use reason-
care toward his or her safety. But 
ordinary behavior and social rela-
actors have the duty to act rea-
This common law premise is 
by statute in California in 
Code 1714. As the Knight court 
"As a general rule, persons have a 
to use due care to avoid injury to 
and may be held liable if their 
0
.e<tre1ess conduct injures another per-
(See Civ. Code, 1714. )" Id. at 315. 
In Knight the plaintiff's finger was 
;;2;~uan:g1e:d during a touch football game. 
three operations "failed to restore 
movement in [plaintiff's] little fin-
or to relieve the ongoing pain of 
injury," the finger was amputated. 
at 301. 
Before the injury occurred, plaintiff 
complained to defendant that he 
playing too roughly. at 300. 
had said she would not continue 
g unless he was more careful, 
according to plaintiff, he had said 
he would. Id. at 300. Defendant 
c I s c 0 B 
and plaintiff recalled the injury-causing 
play differently. Defendant recalled 
jumping to intercept a pass, missing the 
ball, and colliding with plaintiff. As he 
landed, he stepped backward onto 
plaintiff's hand. Id. at 300. Plaintiff 
and another participant, Starr, recalled 
that Starr had caught the pass, and that 
defendant ran into plaintiff from 
behind, knocking her down. Defendant 
then continued running until he tagged 
Starr, injuring her as well. Id. at 300-
01. 
The gender division between the lit-
igants is striking in these different 
views of the case. The different 
viewpoints held by the participants in 
the injury-causing event provide a fas-
cinating backdrop from which to view 
the divergent viewpoints of the jus-
tices. By calling this case one of prima-
ry assumption of risk, the court is say-
ing that this football playing defendant 
owed no duty to use reasonable care 
toward other players in the game for 
the injuries that he caused. Yet Civil 
Code 1714 states that as a general rule 
persons have a duty to use due care to 
avoid injury to others. The court's deci-
sion implies that recreational sports 
participants are in a different category 
regarding duty. 
The three justice plurality seemed 
very concerned with co-participants in 
sports and how to ensure that players 
should not be liable for every little 
push and jostle that might lead to 
injury. Justice Mosk agreed that no 
duty owed was the correct analysis, 
providing the fourth vote to affirm 
summary judgment for the sports 
defendant. We might call this the 
"sports standard" - hang tough in 
sports because no one owes you a duty 
to use reasonable care in a rough game. 
Recent academic writing has identi-
fied gendered, socialized differences in 
how children play. See Carol Gilligan, 
A R R I s T E R 
In A Different Voice. The sports stan-
dard reflects this male gendered orien-
tation. This acceptance of a sports 
standard makes an interesting contrast 
to the views of the other justices. Jus-
tice Kennard, dissenting, found that a 
duty to use reasonable care was owed 
by the sports defendant. She analyzed 
the case as one raising issues of knowl-
edge and voluntary consent, which 
classically are raised by an assumption 
of risk defense. She believed that a trial 
would be necessary to resolve the 
issues. Two other justices, Baxter and 
Panelli, agreed with the majority result, 
no recovery for the injured player; but 
would have arrived at that result using 
the consent-based assumption of risk 
analysis, finding that the injured player 
had agreed to the defendant's using the 
care of a football player toward her. 
The female litigant's view that players 
should act reasonably toward each 
other, within the rules of the game and 
that the defendant breached that duty is 
not seen by most justices. Most justices 
either scoff at the idea of co-participant 
duty (the sports standard) or discount 
the breach issue raised by the plain-
tiff's version of the facts. It remains to 
be seen whether similar devaluation of 
duty as articulated in Civil Code 1714 
will occur outside the sports setting. 
In Ford v. Gouin, supra, a gendered 
view of the problem is not in evidence, 
but a different serious issue emerges. 
In that case, the plaintiff water-skier 
was injured when he collided with an 
overhanging tree limb while water-ski-
ing barefoot and backwards. Ford 
supra, 3 Cal.4th at 343. This conduct 
probably could be termed foolhardy. 
The court, in its application of Knight, 
states that "the assumption of risk doc-
trine operates as a complete bar [when] 
... the defendant's conduct did not 
breach a legal duty of care owed to the 
plaintiff." (Emphasis added) Ford at 
342. 
The Ford plurality purports to be 
applying its newly articulated no-duty 
owed standard from the Knight case, 
yet the court says that its analysis is 
about breach of duty. The question of 
breach is traditionally one that is with-
in the province of the jury in tort cases. 
If the court is advocating using primary 
assumption of risk, under the guise of 
duty analysis, as a substitute for the 
negligence determination historically 
made by the trier of fact, that usurpa-
tion of jury function would be a radical 
departure from traditional handling of 
tort cases. 
Implied assumption of a reasonable 
risk remains a superfluous tort doc-
trine. A proper analysis of the existing 
elements of the prima facie case of 
negligence, duty, breach, actual cause, 
and proximate cause, will result in a 
fitting disposition of the case. In cases 
where the plaintiff's conduct is at 
issue, the existing tort doctrine of com-
parative fault provides an appropriate 
vehicle for analyzing those issues. 
The so-called defense of implied 
assumption of a reasonable risk, 
whether primary or secondary, is not 
necessary to tort analysis. Assumption 
of risk raises no arguments that are not 
already served by other aspects of the 
prima facie case of negligence. The 
retention of the assumption of risk 
defense results in doctrinal double-
counting, where litigants make repeti-
tive arguments under different doctri-
nal names. 
Hiding behind the language of "pri-
mary assumption of risk" courts may 
be permitted to duck serious issues of 
social obligation traditionally raised by 
the duty issue, without doing the analy-
sis necessary to reveal the decision-
making process. The evaluation 
whether a duty is owed is within 
province of the judge, but the 
gence determination, if defendant does 
owe plaintiff a duty, should be allowed 
to the jury. 
Traditionally the jury is called upon 
to resolve cases upon which reasonable 
people might differ. Reasonable men 
and reasonable women often see the 
same situation from very different per-
spectives. Cf. Ellison v. Brady, 924. · 
F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991) (establishing 
reasonable woman standard to evaluate 
sexual harassment: "conduct that many 
men consider unobjectionable may. 
offend many women." Id. at 878.) 
touch football game is another place 
where gender differences might color a; 
participant's or decisionmaker's view 
of reality. Understanding that these: 
gender differences exist would be 
beneficial step toward greater fairness 
in judging and in decisionmaking. 
Cf.Catharine Wells, Situated Decisio~. 
making, 63 S. Cal. Law Rev.1721 
(1990). Obfuscating the issue of view-
point with more doctrinal language, 
such as primary assumption of risk, 
will not bring us closer to our aspira-
tion for justice. 
Stephanie M. Wildman is a Profes~ 
sor of Law at the University of San 
Francisco School of Law. Some of the 
author's concerns about assumption 
risk have been previously expressed 
"Time to Abolish Implied Assumption 
of a Reasonable Risk ltt 
California" (co-authored with John C. 
Barker), 25 U.S.F L.Rev. 647 (1991). 
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